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Abstract : 
 
This paper demonstrates that trade regionalization has important 
monetary and exchange rate implications. It goes on and argues that EU 
increased importance in the monetary field following the euro’s introduction and 
the anticipated development of its international role may contain the hazard of 
confrontation between the major blocks and therefore lead to a system less stable 
than a unpopular system. Appropriate arrangements for cooperation between the 
poles will be crucial to the stability of the system. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Despite the increase in international trade the trend towards trade 
regionalization is well evident. World Trade Organization (WTO) members are 
required to grant the same favorable conditions to all "WTO members”. However, 
the WTO also allows a departure from this principle in the case of regional trade 
agreements. Nearly all of the WTO members have concluded regional trade 
agreements (RTAs) with other countries: 137 RTAs were in existence as of end of 
2000 (www.wto.org/wto/develop/regional.htm). In the real world the implications 
of trade blocks such as the overall growth in the market and the impact on 
companies of expanding productions and achieving economies of scale as well as 
trade diversion  (trade shifts to countries in the group at the expense of trade with 
countries not in the group) appear more appealing than unilateral trade 
disarmament. Most trade groups contain neighboring countries because: 
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1. The distances the goods need to travel between such countries are short. 
2. Consumers' tastes are likely to be similar, and distribution channels can be 
established in adjacent countries 
In addition Countries—even if they're not neighbors—will form trade 
alliances/groups agreements if their political ideologies are similar.  
  In this paper we focus on the European Union (EU) and the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) because of the high level of 
integration in both areas and especially the size and degree of integration in the 
EU. That is not to minimize the importance of other groups (such as the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA), the Central European Free Trade Agreement 
(CEFTA) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)) to their 
member countries, but we will use these groups to illustrate different types of 
regional economic integration. We also consider the possible effects of EMU on 
the structure of the international monetary regime. 
 
2. Regional Economic Integration 
The case of the north american free trade agreement (NAFTA) 
 
NAFTA, which includes Canada, the United States, and Mexico, went into 
effect in 1994, but it was preceded with the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. 
The U.S. and Canada historically have had various forms of mutual economic 
cooperation. Long negotiations between these two countries resulted in the 
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA), effective on January 1, 1989. In the 
early 1990s, Mexico approached the United States to establish a free-trade 
agreement. The negotiations that included Canada were finally led to North 
American Free Trade Agreement, effective on January 1, 1994. 
NAFTA has a logical rationale, in terms of both geographic location and 
trading importance. U.S.-Mexican and U.S.-Canadian trade was significant when 
the agreement was signed. The two-way trading relationship between the United 
States and Canada is the largest in the world. NAFTA is a powerful trading bloc 
with a combined population and total GNP greater than the 15-member EU. 
Significantly in importance, especially when compared with the EU, is the 
tremendous size of the U.S. economy in comparison to those of Canada and 
Mexico.  
 
NAFTA covers the following areas: 
 
• Market access: tariff and non-tariff barriers, rules of origin, governmental 
procurement. Trade rules -safeguards, subsidies, countervailing and 
antidumping duties, and health and safety standards. 
• Services: equivalent safeguards for trade in services (consulting, 
engineering, software, etc.). 
• Investments: investment rules governing minority interests, portfolio 
investment, real property and majority-owned or controlled investments 
from the NAFTA counties.  
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• Intellectual property: adequate and effective protection and enforcement 
of intellectual property rights, while ensuring that enforcement measures 
do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade.  
• Dispute settlement: a dispute settlement process that will be followed 
instead of countries taking unilateral action against an offending party. 
 
An important component of NAFTA is the concept of rules of origin and regional 
value content. Because NAFTA is a free trade agreement and not a customs 
union, each country sets its own tariffs to the rest of the world. That is why a 
product entering the United States from Canada must have a commercial or 
customs invoice that identifies the product's ultimate origin. Otherwise, an 
exporter from a third country would always ship the product to the NAFTA 
country with the lowest tariff and then re-export it to the other two countries duty-
free. According to local content rules, at least 50 percent of the net cost of most 
products must come from the NAFTA region.  
Most free trade agreements in the world are based solely on reducing 
tariffs. However, NAFTA is a very different free trade agreement. Due to strong 
objections to the agreement by labor unions and environmentalists, two side 
agreements covering those issues were included in NAFTA. More specifically, the 
labor lobby in the United States forced the inclusion of labor standards, such as 
the right to unionize, and the environmental lobby pushed for an upgrade of 
environmental standards in Mexico and the strengthening of compliance. The 
NAFTA Commission, a cabinet-level body established with the responsibility of 
implementing the agreements and side agreements, focus specifically on labor 
rights and environmental issues.  
Although a NAFTA Secretariat was established to administer the NAFTA 
dispute resolution processes, the Agreement encourages parties to resolve trade 
conflicts together without using the Secretariat. Given the US dominance the three 
countries concerned can not negotiate as equals on trade disputes. 
 
3. How much territory will regional integration cover 
 
Will regional integration be the wave of the future, or will the WTO become the 
focus of global economic integration? The WTO's objective is to reduce barriers 
to trade in goods, services, and investment. Regional groups attempt to do that and 
more. Although the EU has introduced a common currency and is increasing the 
degree of cooperation in areas such as security and foreign policy, the WTO will 
never engage in those issues. Regional integration deals with the specific 
problems facing member countries, while the WTO needs to be concerned about 
all countries in the world.  
NAFTA and the EU are the key regional groups where significant 
integration is taking place. In the future, these groups would continue to expand to 
include other countries.  
When the United States began its discussions with Mexico and Canada, it 
perceived a future effort to integrate North, Central, and South America into an 
"Enterprise of the Americas." The idea was to have the United States enter into a 
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series of bilateral trade relationships with Latin American countries that would 
result in a "hub and spokes" arrangement, with the United States as the hub and 
other countries at the other end of the free trade spokes. Eventually, these bilateral 
relationships would result in one huge multilateral relationship between all of the 
Americas—Canada and Mexico included. However, that has not taken place. U.S. 
protectionism has kept the United States from entering into other bilateral 
relationships, but that has not stopped Canada and Mexico. Both countries have 
entered into a free trade agreement with Chile, perceived to be the next country 
that could join NAFTA, and the agreements were modeled after NAFTA. In 
addition, Mexico entered into a free trade agreement with the European Union 
that would end all tariffs on bilateral trade by 2007. The key for NAFTA will be 
whether or not the U.S. Congress can avoid getting caught up in protectionist 
sentiment and allow expansion to take place. If it does not, Canada and Mexico 
will continue to engage in bilateral agreements with non-NAFTA countries in the 
region along the lines of the NAFTA agreement.  
The EU will continue to expand east until it meets Russia, and then its 
expansion will stop. The enlargement of the EU is planned to include at least 12 
and possibly as many as 20 new members, most of them former communist 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe 
Regional integration in Africa will continue at a slow pace due to the 
existing political and economic problems there, but Asian integration, primarily in 
APEC, will pick up steam as the economies of East and Southeast Asia recover.  
 
4. The link between trade and exchange rate policy 
 
The core element of the EU which all economists approve is the 
completion of the free market program with free movements of goods and factors 
of production. Here it is essentially to stress the clear division that exists between 
the proponents and opponents of the EURO.  
The proponents of the EURO argue that a fixed exchange rate system and 
the introduction of a single currency is a necessary precondition for the 
acceptance, maintenance and success of the Single Market. On the other hand, the 
opponents ague that flexible exchange rates provide a useful instrument of 
adjusting to external, balance of payments, shocks and therefore allows a free and 
open international market to operate smother.  
In fact, as it has been pointed out above, the NAFTA involved many 
contentious points, but concern over exchange rates has been conspicuously 
absent from the discussions. The question therefore raised is that if NAFTA is 
proceeding without requiring side agreements over exchange rates; why then in 
the case of  the Single Market in Europe such a requirement was necessary? 
Given that exchange rates can be used as instrument of demand switching 
policy (switching demand away from imports in favour to domestically produced 
goods) and therefore have an equivalent effect on trade as tariff barriers, trade 
agreements have significant exchange rate and monetary implications. In other 
words, countries, such as France, will not be prepared to leave their economies 
open to free movement of goods, enterprises and factors of production if they 
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suspect that other countries (e.g. Italy) are trying to obtain an unfair trading 
advantage, for example by competitive devaluation. If there is to be freedom of 
trade and migration, there should also be an agreement on exchange rates 
One difference between North America and Europe in this respect  may 
have been that Mexico has been following a strong peso as a counter-inflationary 
policy, while the Bank of Canada has been undertaking a generally restrictive 
monetary policy in pursuit of a domestic target for price stability. As far as 
monetary policy focuses, either through regulatory provisions or administrative 
practices, on an internal target for nominal incomes, or price stability, then there 
would marginal need  for an agreement on exchange rates. But the objectives of 
monetary policy can change. Should the monetary authorities, in one part of a free 
trade area, be perceived to be giving weight to considerations of competitiveness, 
relative exchange rates and employment, then its partners are likely to become 
concerned, and seek agreement. The “benign neglect” of monetary policy and 
exchange rate issues in the NAFTA negotiations may be the product of the 
particular conjuncture of current monetary policy postures in Mexico and Canada. 
If the latter was to change, the omission of any side-agreement on monetary 
relative exchange rates might sometime prove quite troubling.     
  
5. Looking into the future:  
    International economic cooperation after emu 
 
According to the EU Commission “The Euro Area will have a single 
exchange rate policy formulated within the framework given by the Maastricht 
Treaty. The predominance of the domestic pricwe stability objective and the likely 
reduced sensitivity of the euroarea to exchange rate fluctuations will not lead to an 
attitude of bening neglect by the euro-erea. The euro exchange rate will be an 
important variable both for economic agents and policy makers. The Combination 
of the ECB aiming at price stability and the Unino’s strong commitment to 
budgetary discipline, re-enforced by the Stabilitry and Growth Pact should result 
in a balanced policy mix. The move to EMU would enable the EU to speak with 
one voice in echange rate discussions at G7 level might influence the possibilities 
of international co-ordination within the present international monetary regime. 
EMU should increase the symmetry of international monetary relations, thereby 
opening the way to more international economic cooperation. The Eu’s increase 
importance in the monetary sphere is likely to result in increased calls for 
coordination internationally”  
At present significant problems tend to arise from the inter-play of fiscal 
policies, largely under the command of the national authorities and monetary 
policy. It is well recognized that the inter-action of monetary and fiscal policy 
may determine the exchange rate. Thus if the EU should wish to achieve some 
particular outcome for the exchange rate, and with monetary policy predicated to 
the achievement of internal price stability, then the EU fiscal policy in aggregate 
has to be adjusted to that end. There is able skepticism about the ability of the 
stability pact to achieve any desired aggregate fiscal outcome for the EU as a 
whole. Given the uncertainty about the appropriate stance of fiscal policies, the 
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wider range of differing objectives which fiscal policy fiscal policy pursues, 
including allocative, distributive, stabilizing, etc. and the political difficulties of 
making any such changes, coordination of national fiscal policies for purposes of 
external policy coordination seems highly unlikely. Fiscal policy is the last area 
where national sovereignty is prepared to be surrendered.  
It is therefore reasonably to assume that the EU will not be in a position 
for the foreseeable future, credibly to commit itself as a single entity to the 
achievement of any particular fiscal outcome. The EU is not alone in this respect. 
The executive branch of the US government has seldom been able to control fully 
its fiscal stance, or to coordinate the thrust of monetary policy (controlled by the 
independent Fed) with that of fiscal policy, (controlled partly by Congress).  
The second main claim above is that the EC is likely to be able to improve 
its bargaining stance, especially vis-a-vis US. At present, Europe appears as a 
collection of medium-sized policy centres facing two major poles, the US and 
Japan. According to the EU officials this asymmetry implies that cetefis paribus 
the United States has presently less to gain than Europe in transatlantic 
coordination. Since co-ordination always involves risks and costs, at least those 
which arise from domestic political considerations, the incentive for the US to 
engage in such an exercise is weak. To some extent, the United States can exploit 
this asymmetry by making its policy choices in an non-co-ordinated fashion 
without suffering much from a similar behaviour of European nations. 
In addition, always according to the same arguments, the greater weight 
and unity of the EU would cause to the USA extra losses from lack of co-
operation, and hence would not only drive the US to co-ordinate more closely 
with the EU, but would also shift the benefits from such international 
relationships more in favour of the latter, at any level of policy cooperation.  
While these arguments may have some partial validity we view the 
conclusion, that the USA will be induced to co-ordinate, on a more even basis, 
with the EU with some scepticism. The implication appears to be that, because of 
its greater comparative power and size, the USA has hitherto been able to avoid 
serious participation in international economic bargaining. Instead the evidence 
indicates that most initiatives for the positive co-ordination of national policies 
have initiated from the US and have more frequently run into opposition and 
objection from other G7 partners.  
However in these US initiatives have usually involved other countries, e.g. 
Germany and Japan, in changing their policies without much, or any, quid pro quo 
from the Americans in terms of shifts in the US fiscal/monetary policy. But this 
latter apparent immobility of US policies, especially fiscal policy, is usually 
explained, not in terms of an asymmetric use of relative power, but of the 
incapacity of the Executive branch in the US to control Congress and deliver any 
agreement. Now this may, to some extent, be a convenient fiction for bargaining 
purposes. The separation of powers in the US Constitution makes it extremely 
difficult for the USA to become a significantly more cooperative bargainer in 
future than it is now, at least without a fundamental Constitutional change, which 
at present seems highly unlikely. 
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Thus we consider the arguments expressed by EU Commission officials 
that the US has not previously bargained co-operatively, because of its greater 
power; that it will now face greater losses unless it should bargain on a more 
equal basis and hence will be induced to change its posture; and that the EU will 
reap benefits from the induced US change of posture, as invalid. If the view that a 
united Europe can more easily force concessions from the USA prevails in 
Europe, then then there is a serious hazard of mutual resentment, and even 
confrontation. It would be far better if it were accepted that independent, and quite 
different, political systems leave very little room for policy co-ordination, in the 
monetary field at least. 
This leads on to the final question here which is whether a tri-polar system 
(USA, EC, Japan) will be more, or less, satisfactory than the prior system of a 
weakening US hegemony. That hegemony has eroded so far already, that the 
world has moved, through a period of more-or-less pure floating (with quite 
unsatisfactory results), to a somewhat managed float. 
Compared to the USA, the European economies are medium-sized. 
Whereas Japan is comparatively more important, relative to the US, and certainly 
perceived as such in the US, the Japanese have not gone out consciously to form a 
Japanese dominated yen bloc in the Pacific area Japan has not taken up any 
politico-economic aggressive stance outside its boundaries. 
In contrast, the EU aspirations go beyond simple monetary integration 
with the aim to develop a federal identity within its borders which will make it, by 
itself, of equal, or greater, weight in population and GDP to the USA. Moreover, 
it is already becoming a magnet for the peripheral countries in Northern and 
Eastern Europe, whose accession to the EU bloc will make it on paper much 
larger than the nations of North America. 
However, the cohesion of the EU bloc, both within the EU core and the 
wider periphery, at least in the transition phase will be fragile. There is a hazard 
that there will be those within the EU who may seek to strengthen internal EU 
cohesion by pointing to an external opponent. Taking into account the current 
Japanese economic situation the USA seems to be the more obvious target for 
such rivalry in the field of macroeconomic policies. This risk may become more 
acute by the trend towards intergorvamentalism in the EU i.e. the weakening of 
the European Commission and the ascendancy of national governments in 
controlling the destiny of the EU. 
Trade disputes would exacerbrate this hazard. During the cold war there 
was a great number of serious trade disputes between the EU and the US. 
However, inspite of some unilateral acts of smooth retaliation, a degree of restrain 
was evident in all cases because both sides realized the danger of economic 
conflict spilling over into political area. For example when the WTO ruled that 
American export subsidies wereillegal, the EU could have lawfully raise tarrif 
barriers against a significant amount of American trade. However the EU holded 
off from doing so to protect the political relationship with the US. In spite of 
many argumments to the contrary, there had always been a loose linkage between 
trade and political cooperation and partnership. However, given the strong link 
between tade and exchange rate policies (which have been demonstrated in an 
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earlier part of this paper) if serious strains arise on the one side of the relationship, 
there will be a significant danger that the other will suffer. Trade disputes may 
thus trigger a chain reaction that could foreclose macro-economic policies and 
bring international cooperation to a total halt. 
Placing excessive emphasis on trade regionalization increases the 
likelihood of mutual resentment, and even confrontation. The key for NAFTA 
will be whether or not the U.S. Congress can avoid getting caught up in 
protectionist sentiment and allow expansion to take place. The recent decision of 
the US to impose tariffs on steel threatens wider EU-US cooperation and lives less 
hope for the future.     
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The establishment of a tri-polar international monetary system would of 
itself be a major cause for any shifting in geopolitical relationships, which contain 
the foundation of an economic enmity between the EU and the US. This would be 
a symptom of a rebalancing in politico-economic structures more broadly. The 
combination of disputable benefits of political cooperation, excessive emphasis on 
regional trade agreements and major bloc bargaining is a dangerous coctail 
involving the hazard of frustration, resentment and even confrontation which 
would be detrimental to world growth and trade.. 
How can we best proceed to minimise the hazard of such confrontation 
between the major blocs? One helpful step would be for both sides to recognize 
more clearly the political constraints preventing the other from adjusting flexibly; 
for both sides to recognize that the use of threats and power-plays to extort 
concessions from the other could have adverse longer-term consequences; and 
hence for both sides to appreciate that the room for positive co-operative 
behaviour, in the determination of macro-economic policy, is very limited. 
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